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Henry Holt and Company, 2017. ISBN 978-1-627779-635-4.
Photographs. Notes. Sources cited. Index. Pp. xxv, 324. $30.00.
Most Americans are well aware that organizations like the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) have long sought to recruit the best and
brightest from the hallowed halls of our most respected academic
institutions. The presence of such agencies on campuses has been a staple
of higher education, except in instances where protests temporarily
compelled universities to reject it, but the close relationship between those
agencies and educational institutions has enjoyed a post-9/11 resurgence.
The search for recruits, however, is benign in comparison to other
activities being pursued on campuses. Thus, fewer Americans are aware of
the extensive presence of both foreign and domestic operatives who are
covertly engaged in clandestine activities on those campuses. It is
precisely that sort of undisclosed activity that Pulitzer Prize winning
journalist Daniel Golden seeks to bring to light in this work. None of this
will be startling news to anyone in the intelligence community, although
the details of operations may certainly enhance professionals’
understanding of these kinds of activities. For the student, novice, or the
general public, the narrative is likely to be more revealing. The ever
increasing number of foreign students and foreign faculty members on
American campuses makes the topic a compelling one to consider. In
addition to a significant increase in the number of foreign-born faculty
members now working in STEM and other fields on U.S. campuses,
Higher Education institutions in the U.S. have also come to rely
increasingly on the enrollment of foreign students as a way to financially
subsidize the schools. Often, foreign students eagerly pay the full sticker
price for tuition at prestigious schools, and as non-residents they pay more
at public, taxpayer-supported institutions. Some schools even add an
additional fee for international students.
Although most foreign students are merely seeking the best and most
prestigious educational experience they can find, their presence in high
numbers increases the possibility that at least some of them might be
working for their nation’s intelligence services. At the same time their
presence opens an opportunity for U. S. Intelligence agencies to exploit
those students for the agencies’ own purposes. The same principle applies
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to faculty members. Thus, as Golden documents, both the counterintelligence and the positive intelligence missions are enjoying a robust
run of activity on American campuses, often with the unwitting complicity
of naive faculty members and administrators who either do not think in
terms of potential intelligence threats, or in some cases choose to ignore
them. Although, as Golden suggests, such activities might contaminate the
traditional ivory tower paradigm of academic freedom among a normally
open and independent scholarly community, some institutions simply
choose to ignore the potential for espionage that stems from globalized
academic connections because it is to their economic advantage to do so.
Golden’s objective in this book was to “explore how and why intelligence
services were targeting American higher education, and what the
implications were for national security and academic freedom” (xvi). He
divides his book into two distinct parts. Part one looks at instances of
espionage on campuses, and part two examines U.S. attempts to exploit
foreign students and the academic environment in general. Recognizing
that both sides seek to milk the situation for all it’s worth, Golden goes on
to rely on his journalistic skills to uncover information and utilize case
studies of specific individuals to illustrate various instances of how
exploitation is actually accomplished. Many cases involve students or
faculty members associated with the kinds of scientific and technology
fields that deal with information that could provide some unique
advantage to one side or another. Golden raises a valid point in
questioning whether clandestine activities that contribute to national
security simultaneously damage academic collaboration by heightening
suspicions among professors that potential collaborators might be
functioning with ulterior motives on behalf of a third party. Moreover,
though his sample is a small one, Golden finds that recruiting our own
professors as amateur spies seems not to yield very promising results.
Whether from their reluctance or incompetence, Golden concludes that
the lack of success has had a detrimental impact on academic culture and
outweighs any small benefits that have been realized. Perhaps more
damaging is that some professors, like their institutions, sometimes fall
victim to the ultimate weakness of an ivory tower outlook and thus ignore
or fail to recognize the potentially nefarious motives of foreign
counterparts in their field.
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In terms of targeting foreign students, recruitment frequently relies on
money as an incentive, and it is often a successful method for putting
sources on the books, but the long-range prognosis for actually obtaining
useful returns from those relationships is less certain. As for the targeting
of foreign professors, Golden notes that one intelligence agent suggested
that academic conferences were a more fruitful venue than campuses. The
much publicized case of University of South Florida (USF) Professor Dajin
Peng—whose story constitutes a significant segment of the book—
illustrates that the possibilities for recruiting foreign faculty members are
many, but are not always profitable. Peng’s personal indiscretions and
allegations of mismanagement at his university set him up nicely for an
FBI approach. He was a tainted, but highly qualified candidate. A
graduate of China’s Institute of International Relations, Peng had
extensive contacts in the Chinese intelligence community. He later
received his doctorate at Princeton and moved on to a position at USF,
where he established Florida’s first Confucius Institute, whose branches
are closely connected with the Chinese government. Naturally such an
institution was of much interest to the FBI, and when Peng fell afoul of
USF in the wake of several accusations of malfeasance, an FBI agent came
quickly to his support. Though Peng preserved his job and tenured status
at USF, he was punished with fines and suspensions, but without any
criminal charges being lodged. The cost for that leniency was working
against China on behalf of the FBI and CIA. The FBI efforts to salvage
Peng’s career were misguided, however, and he was so reluctant to spy for
the agency that he never really provided any useful information at all
despite his many trips to China. Later he even accused the FBI of
orchestrating the charges against him in an effort to recruit him as a spy.
In conclusion, Golden relates an interesting, though sometimes
unnecessarily speculative tale that provides a sound introduction to the
relationships between the intelligence community and academia. Readers
should take note, however, that it is a journalist’s tale told in journalistic
fashion. It is not the product of extensive scholarly research and it is
based largely on news sources and other publically available materials
supplemented by first-hand interviews. The interview material elevates
the book to a higher level, although the deficiencies in the overall quality of
the research undermine the academic quality of the work and frequently
compel readers to accept the validity of interviewees’ comments at face
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value. It is far from a fatal flaw though, as there is no reason to question
the general thrust of the book or its conclusions despite those limitations.
Edward J. Hagerty, Ph.D., American Public University System
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